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Commentary on "Adhesion to Canadian Indian
Treaties and the Lubicon Lake Dispute*
Kent McNeil
Osgoode Hall Law School
York University
Thomas Flanagan's article on adhesion to Indian treaties in this issue of the
Canadian Journal of Law and Society is a bold foray into a virtually unexplored
area of aboriginal rights. Although adhesions to most of the eleven Numbered
Treaties in northern and western Canada were common, as Flanagan points out,
not much attention has been paid to them. The matter is nonetheless of major
importance for many aboriginal peoples, as was demonstrated by the decision of
the Supreme Court of Canada last year that the Teme-Augama Anishnabai had
surrendered their aboriginal title by adhesion to the 1850 Robinson-Huron Treaty.I
There can be little doubt that the issue is going to arise more frequently as other
aboriginal peoples challenge the application of treaties to their ancestral lands.
Flanagan's article deals with two matters. First, it examines adhesions to the
Numbered Treaties generally, and presents a classification for them based on the
federal government's treaty-making practice. Secondly, it looks at the Lubicon
land claim in northern Alberta in light of this classification, and suggests that
failure to resolve the claim is due largely to "a disagreement over the concept of
adhesion." I find Flanagan's characterization of the nature of the Lubicon dispute
to be helpful, as it clarifies a fundamental issue in Indian treaty law. The issue is
this: In a situation where an aboriginal group2 whose ancestral lands are within a
treaty area did not sign the treaty, do they have existing aboriginal land rights, or
simply a claim to receive the same treaty benefits as the aboriginal groups who did
sign the treaty? Or, to put it another way, assuming the treaty validly extinguished
the land rights of the aboriginal signatories,' would it have had the same impact on
* I would like to thankBrian Slattery for his very helpful comments on adraftof this paper.
1. A.-G. for Ontario v. Bear Island Foundation, (1991) 127 N.R. 147 (S.C.C.).
2. I use the general term "group" instead of nation, tribe, band or other designation in this
context to avoid problems of definition which might otherwise occur, and because I do
not want to limit the application of my discussion of land claims to a particular kind of
collectivity. My use of this term is not an implicit denial of the legitimate claims of
aboriginal peoples to nationhood.
3. A "clear and plain" intention to extinguish would have to be proven (Sparrow v. The
Queen, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 at 1099), taking into consideration the historical context,
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the rights of the group who did not sign? The significance of an adhesion to the
treaty by this group depends on how this initial issue is resolved.
Flanagan suggests that a clear distinction exists between what he calls "internal"
and "external" adhesions. Internal adhesions involve aboriginal groups whose
ancestral lands are within the area described by the treaty but who were not
present at the original treaty negotiations or who did not accept the terms at that
time. They signed later, either in the same year at another meeting-place on the
treaty commissioners' initial circuit, or in a subsequent year. External adhesions
involve aboriginal groups whose land claims lie outside the treaty's original
limits, requiring a territorial extension of the treaty.
Flanagan's research has revealed that the federal government seems to regard
internal and external adhesions as legally distinct. An external adhesion involves
the surrender by the adherents of their aboriginal rights to specific lands which
they claim as a distinct aboriginal group. Those lands then become part of the
treaty area as extended by the adhesion. According to Flanagan, internal adhesions
are different because the government apparently thinks that all the lands within
the original treaty area form a whole, aboriginal title to which is extinguished
when "a sufficient number" of claimant groups within the area sign the treaty. The
Lubicon claim contradicts the government's understanding because the Lubicons
allege that they have unextinguished aboriginal title to their ancestral lands within
the original limits of Treaty Eight on the grounds that they have never signed the
treaty.
While Flanagan presents both sides in this debate, he devotes much more space
to the government's position, support for which he finds in both Crown practice
and the treaties' terms. The treaties, however, are at best equivocal in this respect.
Treaty Eight provides:
... the said Indians [Cree, Beaver, Chipewyan and other Indians, inhabiting the
district hereinafter defined and described] do hereby cede, release, surrender and
yield up to the Government of the Dominion of Canada ... all their rights, titles
and privileges whatsoever, to the lands included within the following limits ...
[a]nd also the said Indian rights, titles and privileges whatsoever to all other lands
wherever situated in the Northwest Territories, British Columbia, or in any other
portion of the Dominion of Canada.4
the record of negotiations, and the aboriginal understanding of the agreement (A. -G. of
Quebec v. Sioui, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025, esp. 1035-36, 1045). One cannot, as Flanagan
appears to suggest, rely simply on the surrender clause in the treaty itself: see Re
Paulette, (1973) 42 D.L.R. (3d) 8 (N.W.T.S.C.) esp. 30-35, reversed on other grounds
(1975) 63 D.L.R. (3d) 1 (N.W.T.C.A.), [197712 S.C.R. 628; K. McNeil, "The HighCost
of Accepting Benefits from the Crown: A Comment on the Temagami Indian Land
Case" [1992] 1 C.N.L.R. 40 at 62-68.
4. Treaty No. 8 Made June 21, 1899, and Adhesions, Reports, Etc. (Ottawa: Queen's
Printer, 1966) at 12.
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This may imply, as Flanagan suggests, that the Cree, Beaver, Chipewyan and
other Indian parties were regarded by the government as having one common
claim to the whole treaty area. But it could also mean that they each had a claim to
distinct lands within the treaty area (and possibly elsewhere) which would all be
covered by this general surrender provision, thereby avoiding the unnecessary
and potentially contentious task of delineating each group's claim separately. As
the Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly said that ambiguities in treaties are
to be resolved in the Indians' favour,' this interpretation is to be preferred over
that suggested by Flanagan. Moreover, it corresponds with the reality of aboriginal
life as, making allowance for some overlap, each group did have a definite
territory for hunting, fishing and other resource use.6 Certainly the treaty
commissioners were not so ill-informed as to believe that the Cree, Beaver and
Chipewyan Indians living within the treaty area all claimed the same lands.7
Canadian case law confirms that distinct aboriginal groups have land rights to
specific areas. In Baker Lake v. Minister of Indian Affairs Mahoney J. said that a
claim to aboriginal title requires proof that the claimants and their ancestors
formed an organized society and that they "occupied the specific territory over
which they assert the aboriginal title ... to the exclusion of other organized
societies."8 With some modifications, this test for proof of aboriginal title has
been applied in other cases.'
The view that a treaty extinguishes aboriginal title throughout the designated area
when enough aboriginal signatures are obtained encounters other obstacles as well.
For one thing,just how many signatures are required? If aboriginal leaders representing
over 50 percent of the aboriginal population in the treaty area sign on, is that
sufficient? What if all the Beaver and Chipewyan but none of the Cree leaders had
signed Treaty Eight-would the Cree's title have been extinguished by the acceptance
of the treaty by those other tribes? The very idea that extinguishment could occur in
5. E.g., see Nowegijick v. The Queen, [ 1983] 1 S.C.R. 29 at 36; Simon v. The Queen, [ 1985]
2 S.C.R. 387 at 402; R. v. Horseman, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 901 at 906-07.
6. See M. Rossignol, "Property Concepts among the Cree of the Rocks" (1939) 12
Primitive Man 61; H. Brody, Maps and Dreams (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books,
1983).
7. The reports of the treaty commissioners and the record of signatures reveal that the
commissioners dealt with different aboriginal groups at different places within the
treaty's territorial limits: e.g., see Report of Commissioner for Treaty No. 8 in Treaty
No. 8, supra, note 4, at 20, where J. A. Macrae reported taking "adhesions of certain of
the Indians of Fort St. John and the whole of those of Fort Resolution on Great Slave
lake, whose hunting grounds lie within treaty limits" (my emphasis).
8. [1980] 1 F.C. 518 at 557-58 (F.C.T.D.).
9. SeeA.-G.forOntario v. BearI sland Foundation, (1984)15 D.L.R. (4th) 321 (Ont. S.C.)
at 335. In Delgamuukw v. The Queen, [1991] 3 W.W.R. 97 (B.C.S.C.) at 388,
McEachem C.J. questioned whether the occupation had to be exclusive.
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such a way is all the more suspect when one considers that the territorial extent of
Treaty Eight appears to have been determined in advance by the government. 0
Extinguishment of the aboriginal tide of a group who did not sign would therefore
depend arbitrarily on whether their ancestral lands happened to lie inside or outside
the treaty's boundaries. Moreover, the government would be able to extinguish the
title of recalcitrant groups simply by manipulating the boundaries.
So the suggestion that the land rights of all aboriginal groups within a treaty
area would be extinguished when the representatives of some unspecified number
of groups signed does not stand up to scrutiny. Regardless of the practice and
views of the Canadian government, as a matter of general constitutional principle,
the Crown (i.e., the executive branch of government) cannot make law." In
entering into Indian treaties as in other dealings with vested rights, the Crown
must follow the legal rules established by legislation and judicial decisions.
The legal rules respecting Indian treaties were laid down in the Royal
Proclamation of 1763,12 the Indian provisions of which are still in force. 3 Among
other things, the proclamation provides that, if any of the nations or tribes of
Indians connected with and living under the protection of the Crown wish to
dispose of their unsurrendered lands, the lands can be purchased only by the
Crown at a public assembly of those Indians held for that specific purpose. 4 This
10. See Order in Council Setting Up Commission for Treaty 8, P.C. No. 2749 in Treaty No.
8, supra, note 4, at 3-4; R. Fumoleau, As Long As This Land Shall Last: A History of
Treaty 8 and Treaty 11, 1870-1939 (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1973) at 58-60.
11. See S.A. de Smith, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 4th ed. by Harry Street and
Rodney Brazier (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1981), 79-80; E.C.S. Wade and
A.W. Bradley, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 10th ed. (London: Longmans,
1985), 60-63; Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto:
Carswell, 1985) at 284. The Crown can make law only to the extent that authority to do
so has been delegated to it by the legislature.
12. R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 1. Ironically, the Royal Proclamation is Crown legislation,
issued under authority of the rule of British colonial law that the Crown can legislate in
conquered and ceded colonies until a representative assembly is promised or created:
see Campbell v. Hall (1774) Lofft 655 (K.B.). It was made possible by the cession of
New France to Britain in 1763. See generally Brian Slattery, Land Rights ofIndigenous
Canadian Peoples (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1979).
13. See The King v. McMaster, [1926] Ex. C.R. 68 (Can. Ex.) at 72-74; Easterbrook v. The
King, [1931] S.C.R. 210 at 214-15, 217-18; R. v. Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs, [1982] Q.B. 892 (Engl. C.A.) esp. 913; and commentary onA. -
G. for Ontario v. Bear Island Foundation, (1989) 68 O.R. (2d) 395 (Ont. C.A.) in
McNeil, supra, note 3, at 55-58.
14. R.S.C. 1985, App. I, No. 1 at 6. Although there is uncertainty over the proclamation's
territorial extent, the Supreme Court of Canada appears to regard its surrender provi-
sions, at least, as being generally applicable: see Guerin v. The Queen, [ 1984] 2 S.C.R.
335 at 376-82.
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provision, which is as applicable to purchases of Indian lands by adhesion as by
original treaty, obliges the Crown to obtain a formal surrender from each group
holding aboriginal title within a designated area for the Crown to have a clear title
to all the lands located there. 5
The protection accorded to aboriginal land rights by the Royal Proclamation is
supported by general principles of Anglo-Canadian law. Since at least the
seventeenth century, the common law has been vigilant in shielding vested
rights-especially property rights-from violation by the Crown.16 Although the
Supreme Court of Canada has successfully avoided any clear definition of aboriginal
land rights by saying they are sui generis," the Court's unanimous decision in
Canadian Pacific Limited v. Paul 8 indicates that these rights are proprietary in
nature. As such they are entitled to as much common law protection as other
vested property rights. 9 One consequence of this is that the Crown cannot
extinguish the title of one aboriginal group by signing a treaty with other groups,
any more than it can extinguish the title of one homeowner by purchasing the
houses of other homeowners on the same city block.2"
Returning to the Lubicon claim, if the Lubicons were a distinct aboriginal group
with land rights within the Treaty Eight area, those rights could not as a matter of
law have been extinguished by the treaty if they did not sign it. The Lubicons'
lands would therefore have to be excluded from the lands purportedly surrendered
by the treaty. Currently, one option for the Lubicons would be to adhere to the
treaty, and accept the benefits provided by it. One can call this an internal
adhesion if one likes, but the legal effect would be precisely the same as in the
case of an external adhesion. Another option would be for the Lubicons to
negotiate their own "treaty" with the federal government, which would probably
be more beneficial, given the kind of settlements other aboriginal groups have
obtained in modern land claims agreements.2 However, given that the government
is unlikely to accept negotiations on that basis, the Lubicons would probably be
15. For detailed discussion, see McNeil, supra, note 3, esp. 55-61.
16. See H. Broom, Constitutional Law, 2nd ed. by G. L. Denman (London: Maxwell & Son,
1885), at 225-33.
17. See Guerin v. The Queen, [198412 S.C.R. 335, esp. 382; Sparrow v. The Queen, [1990]
1 S.C.R. 1075 at 1108.
18. [1988] 2 S.C.R. 654 at 677.
19. Contrast Mabo v. Queensland, (1993) 175 C.L.R.I (H.C. Aust.).
20. For detailed discussion of this issue in the context of the 1850 Robinson-Huron Treaty,
see K. McNeil, "The Temagami Indian Land Claim: Loosening the Judicial Strait-
Jacket" in M. Bray and A. Thomson, eds, Temagami: A Debate on Wilderness (Toronto:
Dundurn Press, 1990), at 185.
21. E.g., see The Western Arctic Claim: The Inuvialuit Final Agreement (Ottawa: Indian
and Northern Affairs Canada, 1984).
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obliged either to pursue their claim in court, or to continue asserting their land
rights directly by resisting trespass by oil companies and others who have been
invading their lands.22 In my view, the latter approach has certain procedural
advantages, as the Lubicons would then be able to rely on their possession in any
legal action involving trespass.23 But whatever the form of action, the suggestion
that Treaty Eight extinguished their land rights even if they did not become parties
to it is a legal fantasy which no court in Canada should accept.
22. See generally J. Goddard, Last Stand of the Lubicon Cree (Vancouver: Douglas &
McIntyre, 1991).
23. Fordiscussion of this approach in another context, see K. McNeil, "A Question of Title:
Has the Common Law Been Misapplied to Dispossess the Aboriginals?" (1990) 16
Monash L. Rev. 91 esp. at 107-10.
